Abstract Objectification and dehumanization represent motivational conundrums because they are phenomena in which people are seen in ways that are fundamentally inaccurate; seeing people as objects, as animals, or not as people. The purpose of the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation was to examine the motivational underpinnings of objectification and dehumanization of the self and others. To provide an overall context for this volume, we first provide classic conceptualizations of objectification and dehumanization and speculate about relations between the two. We then introduce a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization within the global versus local processing model (GLOMO) and provide initial supporting evidence. Finally, we introduce the chapters in this volume, which provide additional significant and novel motivational perspectives on objectification and dehumanization.
Objectification and dehumanization represent peculiar motivational conundrums. Despite the importance of accuracy motivation in person perception (Harackiewicz and DePaulo 1982; Kelley 1967; Swann 1984) , objectification and dehumanization are phenomena in which people are perceived in ways that are fundamentally inaccurate. When we objectify, for example, we treat "as an object what is really not an object, what is, in fact, a human being" (Nussbaum 1999, p. 218) . Dehumanization involves a similar disregard for reality, in which we see and treat people not as human.
Understanding the motives underlying this biased perception of people as objects and less than human was the primary aim of the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. This consideration appears to be timely with regard to the historical trajectory of both (a) the Symposium and (b) the scholarship in the areas of objectification and dehumanization. Person perception and attribution have long been of interest to motivation symposium contributors (Brehm 1962; Festinger 1954; Heider 1960; Kelley 1967; Newcomb 1953; Osgood 1957 ) and chapters on topics closely related to objectification and dehumanization such as objectified body image in women (Rodin et al. 1984) and dehumanized perception of aborigines (Jahoda 1989) have been extraordinarily influential-widely cited and regarded as seminal papers in their respective areas. Despite the important linkages and implications of these contributions, no symposium has specifically focused on objectification and dehumanization. Likewise, psychologists have traditionally studied closely related phenomena, such as racial and ethnic conflict and violence (Allport 1954; Azzi 1998) , categorization and stereotyping (Tajfel 1981) , and gendered bodies (Henley 1977) , but theory and research in the specific areas of objectification and dehumanization is of a relatively recent vintage (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Leyens et al. 2001 Leyens et al. , 2003 .
Thus, the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation focused on objectification and dehumanization. Toward that end, the contributors of this volume have provided some of the most influential and provocative perspectives on objectification and dehumanization of the self and others. To contextualize these considerations, we first provide classic conceptualizations of objectification and dehumanization and speculate about relations between the two. We then introduce a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization within the global versus local processing model (GLOMO) and provide initial supporting evidence. Finally, we introduce the chapters in this volume, which provide additional significant and novel motivational perspectives on these phenomena.
Classic Perspectives

Objectification
Scholars across many disciplines have argued that people are sometimes seen and treated as objects. This process is called objectification and occurs when people are treated as things instead of people. Specifically, when a person's body parts or functions are separated from the person, reduced to the status of instruments, or regarded as capable of representing the entire person, he or (most often) she is said to be objectified (Bartky 1990; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; Gruenfeld et al. 2008; MacKinnon 1987; Nussbaum 1995 Nussbaum , 1999 . For example, economists and philosophers have argued that in capitalism, employers objectify their employees, reducing their employees to their work qualities (Marx 1964) . To the employer, the sum of the employees corresponds to their capacity to get the job done. Likewise, in medicine, physicians may objectify a patient, reducing their patients to their symptoms (Barnard 2001; Foucault 1989) .
Sexual Objectification
Of greatest familiarity and empirical examination, scholars have noted that women are sexually objectified in many contexts resulting in significant consequences (Bartky 1990; Code 1995; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; LeMoncheck 1985; McKinley and Hyde 1996; Nussbaum 1999) . Although the origins of these considerations are in critiques of pornography (Dworkin 1981; MacKinnon 1987 MacKinnon , 1989 MacKinnon , 2006 , more recent inquiries represent sexual objectification as a specific type of appearance-focus concentrated on sexual body parts that also emerges during everyday interactions. According to objectification theory, when sexually objectified, a woman's sexual body parts or functions are separated from her person for the use of another. Sexual objectification may be represented on a continuum with more blatant acts and violence, such as assault, exploitation, and trafficking falling on one end and more subtle and covert acts, such as objectifying gazes, inappropriate sexual innuendo, and appearance compliments falling at the other end. Representing a form of body reduction (Langton 2009 ), sexual objectification emerges when people focus on women's appearances, bodies, sexual body parts, or sexual functions more than their faces and other non-observable attributes, such as thoughts, feelings, and desires (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011 , see also Archer et al. 1983 ).
Self-Objectification
Despite its general name, objectification theory Roberts 1997, see also McKinley and Hyde 1996) was developed for the specific purpose of elucidating the adverse psychological consequences for women living in a society in which they are treated as things rather than people. It suggests that one important consequence of sexual objectification is that women learn to be their first surveyors-not only do they experience sexual objectification from others, but they also persistently objectify themselves. When women self-objectify, they internalize an observer's perspective of their bodies and regard their appearance as more important to their self-concept than their other attributes (e.g., physical health, emotions, cognitions ; Bartky 1990; Berger 1972; de Beauvoir 1952; Fredrickson and Roberts 1997; McKinley 1998 McKinley , 2006 McKinley and Hyde 1996) . Through sexual objectification experiences in the media and interpersonal interactions, girls and women learn that it is adaptive to focus on their appearance more than their other attributes. For example, previous research has shown that women (vs. men) consider their observable physical appearance attributes (e.g., body measurements) as more central to their self-concept compared to less observable physical competence characteristics (e.g., strength; Noll and Fredrickson 1998) and persistently think about how they look (McKinley and Hyde 1996) . A multitude of negative consequences are posited to result from objectification experiences through the self-objectification process, including appearance anxiety, body surveillance, body shame, and a diminished capacity for peak motivational states. These intermediary consequences set the stage for psychological disorders that disproportionately affect women, including unipolar depression, eating disorders, and sexual dysfunction (see Calogero et al. 2011; Moradi and Huang 2008, for reviews) . Although psychologists have primarily focused on self-objectification for women, like objectification more generally, it can be conceptualized more broadly with any objectified individuals adopting other people's perspectives of themselves (Fanon 1967; Marx 1964) . To illustrate, the worker may reduce himself to his work-related capabilities, adopting the objectifying gaze of his employer. The medical patient may focus only on her physical symptoms seeing herself through the eyes of the physician. However, most theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) and empirical work (Moradi and Huang 2008) has focused on gender-related self-objectification due to sexual objectification experiences.
Dehumanization
When dehumanized, people are seen and treated similarly to non-humans. For example, when African Americans are represented as apes (Goff et al. 2008 ), fashion models morphed into beer bottles (Earp and Jhally 2010) , or people with disabilities likened to parasites (O'Brien 2003) , they are treated as animals or objects rather than people. Dehumanization also emerges in more subtle ways, with people seeing or treating others as not completely human , see also Haslam 2006 . When human attributes, such as morality, selfcontrol, or emotions are attributed to some, but not others, those people who are denied such attributes are said to be dehumanized, despite the fact that they may still be more human than animals or objects. Dehumanization has primarily been considered within the context of intergroup relations, rather than gender (Haslam 2006; Leyens et al. 2003) . Like objectification, dehumanization also has been of interest to scholars across several disciplines, but has only recently gained traction within psychology.
Infra-Humanization
Leyens and colleagues (e.g., Leyens et al. 2001 Leyens et al. , 2003 Vaes et al. 2003) have theorized that a variant of dehumanization involves seeing outgroups as less human than ingroups. Through this process of infra-humanization, an outgroup is regarded as not quite human. Research in this tradition has primarily focused on emotions and reveals that people similarly attribute primary emotions (e.g., fear, anger) to people from their ingroups and outgroups, but tend to attribute more secondary emotions (e.g., embarrassment) to their ingroups than outgroups. In many ways, this manifestation of infra-humanization is akin to likening outgroups to animals, given that both humans and animals experience primary emotions, but only humans experience secondary emotions. Importantly, these differences emerge explicitly and implicitly (Paladino et al. 2002) .
Humanness
Building on this seminal work, Haslam (2006; see also Haslam et al. 2013) introduced an elaborated model of dehumanization, which distinguishes between two types of dehumanization-the denial of human nature and the denial of human uniqueness. Haslam has argued and found that dehumanization is multidimensional; people engage in animalistic dehumanization, denying others human uniqueness attributes (e.g., civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity). When denied human uniqueness, people are regarded as amoral, irrational, childlike, and unable to control themselves. People also engage in mechanistic dehumanization and deny others human nature attributes (e.g., emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth). When denied human nature, people are regarded as inert, cold, rigid, passive, fungibile, and lacking depth.
Relations Between Objectification and Dehumanization
As the above review shows, the concepts of objectification and dehumanization are closely related. Objectification and dehumanization in the context of gender and pornography illustrates this notion. When a woman is completely reduced to her sexual body parts and functions through pornography (e.g., through the act of creating pornography when the camera lens focuses only on her sexual body parts, as well as the resulting pornographic media), she is denied personhood. Indeed some scholars have conceptualized objectification and specific aspects of dehumanization as identical (Haslam 2006 ; mechanistic dehumanization). Yet, when one is likened to an animal (e.g., animalistic dehumanization, denying human uniqueness), one is not necessarily objectified. For example, denying someone secondary emotions is dehumanizing, but does not necessarily involve a reduction of people to their parts or likening them to objects. In a similar vein, there may be instances when people are objectified or reduced to their sexual body parts, but not necessarily dehumanized. For example, sexual objectification is theorized and regarded as a central aspect of many sexual and romantic encounters; both partners may mutually reduce themselves and the other to their sexual body parts and functions, but not necessarily deny either person humanity (LeMoncheck 1985; Nussbaum 1999) .
In sum, on the surface, the concepts of objectification and dehumanization appear relatively straightforward; likening someone to an object represents objectification and seeing or treating someone as not (completely) human represents dehumanization. Consequently, early work in both of these traditions has treated objectification and dehumanization in somewhat one-dimensional ways; objectification was conceptualized as a specific focus on the appearances, the bodies, the sexual body parts, or the sexual functions of women (Calogero 2013; Goldenberg 2013; Moradi 2013) . Similarly, dehumanization was conceptualized as a mode of appraisal that emerges in intergroup relations, particularly in the context of racial and ethnic outgroups, in which someone is regarded as less than human through the denial of secondary emotions. Yet, more recent considerations of both objectification and dehumanization have incorporated these classic perspectives with novel theoretical positions and current empirical findings to propose much broader and more nuanced notions of these phenomena. For example, researchers have documented that objectification and dehumanization occur outside of the context of gender and racial/ethnic relations, respectively (Fiske 2013; Haslam et al. 2013) .
Researchers have also recently theorized that both objectification and dehumanization may be multidimensional. Just as there are many characteristics that differentiate objects from people (Ostrom 1984) , people may be objectified in varied ways with distinct consequences. For example, Nussbaum (1999) suggested that objects and tools are regarded as instruments, inert, lacking self-determination, fungible, or interchangeable with similar objects, and violable. They are also denied autonomy and subjectivity. When objectified, one, many, or all of these characteristics may be attributed to people in varying degrees, resulting in objectification experiences that are quantitatively different (e.g., mild vs. severe), but also qualitatively different (e.g., seeing factory workers as interchangeable with other factory workers vs. reducing a woman to her sexual functions in pornography).
Like objectification, there also appears to be different types and degrees of dehumanization. Although infra-humanization scholars theorized on seeing people as less than human more generally, they specifically focused on secondary emotions in empirical studies . Haslam (2006) extended this notion to consider the varied ways that someone may be denied humanness and has been able to theoretically and empirically differentiate between denying uniquely human and human nature attributes. These two types of human denial also stem from somewhat different antecedents (e.g., distinct contexts, various groups) and result in somewhat different consequences (e.g., application of negative emotions vs. indifferent emotions).
Finally, although dehumanization and objectification are closely related, the specific association requires further conceptual and empirical investigation. While objectification and dehumanization often occur in tandem (e.g., mechanistic dehumanization) with objectification contributing to dehumanization and vice versa, objectification may occur without concomitant dehumanization (e.g., during a romantic interlude when both partners are focused on the other's sexual functions, but still see their partner as human) and dehumanization may occur without corresponding objectification (e.g., when African Americans are likened to apes in the case of animalistic dehumanization, Haslam 2006) . Thus, objectification and dehumanization may be considered as two overlapping Venn diagrams with some situations representing both objectification and dehumanization, whereas other situations represent objectification or dehumanization only (see a, b, c in Fig. 1 ). Some scholars do not differentiate between objectification and dehumanization (Bartky 1990 , see d in Fig. 1 ) and thus regard the Venn circles as completely overlapping. Other scholars argue that objectification is completely subsumed within dehumanization with the objectification circle falling within the dehumanization circle (e.g., mechanistic dehumanization, Haslam 2006 
Current Perspectives
In the spirit of elaborating and extending these classic perspectives, this volume presents contemporary motivational frameworks on objectification and dehumanization. This consideration reveals extraordinary diversity in conceptualizations, types, targets motivations, and consequences of objectification and dehumanization. We begin by suggesting that objectification stems from local appraisals of people and introduce a unified conceptualization of objectification and subsequent dehumanization based on our own work. We then provide an overview of additional motivational perspectives on these issues offered by leading scholars at the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
A Unified Conceptualization of Objectification and Dehumanization
We suggest that at a basic level, objectification involves a local (vs. global) appraisal of a person. That is, when people objectify others, they focus on their local parts rather than global attributes. When people sexually objectify a woman, for example, they separate some part of the woman (e.g., her appearance, body, sexual body parts, or sexual functions) from her entire person. Most researchers, including those examining objectification of both others (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Strelan and Hargreaves 2005) and the self Noll and Fredrickson 1998) have focused on reducing women to their appearance attributes. When women are reduced to their appearance, this contributes to negative social perceptions of others (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011) and women themselves (Moradi and Huang 2008 ). Yet, women may be further reduced to specific appearance-based parts of themselves in the eyes of others. Theorists and researchers, for example, have further argued that women may not only be reduced to their appearance, but also reduced specifically to their bodies (Langton 2009 ). That is, although appearance-focus has many negative consequences for women, objectification can manifest in a perhaps more insidious, narrowed focus that goes beyond a mere appearance-focus to a form of body reduction (e.g., Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011 , see also Archer et al. 1983) .
Finally, our own work has shown that women may be further locally appraised and reduced beyond a general body focus to their local sexual body parts specifically. That is, women sometimes are reduced from their appearances and entire bodies to their sexual body parts (Bernard et al. 2012 (Bernard et al. , 2013a Gervais et al. 2011a Gervais et al. , 2012 Gervais et al. , 2013 . Behaviors thought to manifest from this local appraisal of women, for example the objectifying gaze characterized as more attention to sexual body parts (e.g., women's breasts) than other body parts (e.g., women's faces), have negative consequences for women (Gervais et al. 2011b; Saguy et al. 2010) .
In the remainder of this section, we briefly outline this unified theory of objectification with a focus on global versus local processing in person perception. We review empirical research suggesting the role of local appraisal in objectification may manifest during different stages of person perception (Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000) . Finally, we introduce critical next steps for research.
Objectification, Person Perception, and the Global Versus Local Processing Model
People can view the same event, person, or thing in multiple ways. Using an example from photography to illustrate this point, people can use a telephoto lens and zoom in on the specific parts of another person or people can adopt a wide angle lens and focus on the entire person. This involves adopting different processing styles when seeing or thinking about stimuli in our environments. A global processing style involves focusing on the Gestalt, whereas a local processing style involves focusing on the constituent parts (Förster and Dannenberg 2010) . The global precedence effect refers to the well-established finding that people generally focus on the Gestalt of a stimulus before focusing on its details; that is, perceivers usually attend to the whole, global structure instead of the local parts. In a classic demonstration of this effect, Navon (1977) showed people large, global letters comprised of small, local letters and found that people more quickly responded to a subsequent letter that matched the global letter compared to the local letter. Yet, people also sometimes adopt local processing styles and the distinction between global and local processing underlies many psychological processes and has important consequences in several domains (Förster 2012 , for review, e.g., Derryberry and Reed 1998; Förster and Higgins 2005; Förster et al. 2008; Gasper and Clore 2002; Mogg et al. 1990 ).
We have suggested and found preliminary evidence for the notion that people adopt a local appraisal of women, including focusing on their appearances, bodies, or sexual body parts and functions, rather than a global appraisal of women, focusing on women as entire people (Bernard et al. 2012; Gervais et al. 2012) . Although not tested specifically within the context of sexual objectification, this idea and related research is consistent with previous work showing links between sex and local processing more generally (Förster 2010) . To illustrate, when participants imagined either a one-night stand with no love involved (sex prime) or a walk with a romantic partner with no lust involved (love prime), the sex prime enhanced local processing and the love prime enhanced global processing. Furthermore, the elicited processing supported or impaired subsequent task performance with sex primes impairing memory for faces (Förster 2010) , facilitating analytic thinking (and hindering creative thinking, , and increasing the likelihood of participants differentiating dimensions about their partners (e.g., whether they were creative, intelligent, attractive, etc.; .
Based on our conceptualization of objectification as a local appraisal of women, we suggest that the global precedence effect may be diminished when people are objectified-through narrowed attention and recognition processes, categorization, impression formation, and behaviors (Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000) . During initial person perception (Zarate and Smith 1990) , people may adopt a local focus on women, attending to and recognizing their bodies and sexual body parts more than their entire bodies. Local categorization may occur when within group similarities and between group differences are accentuated (Tajfel 1981) with women regarded as interchangeable with other women with similar bodies or sexual body parts. Local impression formation may also emerge (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981; Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990) , with sexual object attributes (e.g., passivity) activated and applied and human attributes (e.g., thoughts and feelings) inhibited. Finally, objectifying attitudes and behaviors such as the objectifying gaze may manifest from a local appraisal of women. These effects may occur sequentially. For example, attention to women's sexual body parts may provide the foundation for viewing women with the same body parts as interchangeable with one another. Yet, in some cases, these effects also may be bidirectional or cyclical. For example, viewing a woman as fungible with another woman based on her sexual features may provide the foundation for subsequently attending to her sexual body parts only.
Local Attention and Recognition of Women's Bodies
Research in cognitive psychology shows that global and local processing can contribute to our understanding of person recognition (i.e., recognition of bodies and faces) and object recognition (Reed et al. 2006; Seitz 2002; Tanaka and Farah 1993) . Although there is still some debate among cognitive researchers (see Tarr 2013) , global processing tends to underlie person recognition; to recognize faces and bodies, people use information regarding the specific body parts (e.g., eyes, arms), but also require information regarding the relations and configurations between the parts. Local processing tends to underlie object recognition; people can often recognize objects (e.g., houses) based on information about the specific parts (e.g., doors, windows) without requiring information regarding the spatial relations among stimulus parts (see Maurer et al. 2002, for review) .
Integrating findings on differences between person and object recognition and the notion that people may locally appraise women through reduction to their sexual body parts, we proposed that perceivers may sometimes recognize women's sexual body parts in ways that resemble local object recognition instead of global person recognition. In an initial study examining attention to women's sexual body parts, Gervais et al. (2013) asked participants to adopt a local focus on women's appearance or a more global focus on women's personality (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009 ), as they viewed women with exaggerated sexual body parts (e.g., hourglass figures with larger breasts and narrow waists), average sexual body parts, or attenuated sexual body parts (e.g., tubular figures). Consistent with the notion that women are reduced to their sexual body parts, Gervais et al. (2013) found that under appearance-focus and particularly for women with exaggerated sexual body parts, people gazed more at women's chests and waists and less at their faces, by dwelling for longer times on these body parts and returning attention to these parts over time. This provides initial evidence that when people are asked to adopt a narrowed, local focus on women (focusing on their appearance), they subsequently attend to their sexual body parts.
Extending the notion of a local appraisal of women's bodies to recognition, one robust indicator of global processing from cognitive psychology is the inversion effect. Inverted stimuli are more difficult to recognize than upright stimuli (Yin 1969 ) presumably because inversion disrupts global processing; it is more difficult to use spatial information about the relation between different parts when a stimulus is inverted. Global processing underlies person recognition (i.e., the recognition of faces, the recognition of body postures) and thus, people have more difficulty recognizing inverted people compared to upright people (e.g., Reed et al. 2003 Reed et al. , 2006 . Because inversion does not disrupt local processing and local processing underlies object recognition, however, inversion does not interfere with the recognition of objects; people are able to equally recognize upright and inverted objects.
We suggested that sexualized men may be subject to the inversion effect with upright men recognized better than inverted men, as in classic research on person recognition (Bernard et al. 2012 ). However, if women's bodies are appraised locally and visually reduced to their sexual body parts during initial person perception, as we have suggested, then sexualized women should not be subject to the inversion effect. That is, if women are reduced to their sexual body parts, then inversion, which allows for local, but not global processing, should not disrupt the recognition of women's bodies. To initially consider this possibility, we showed photographs of upright sexualized men and women (e.g., wearing revealing underwear and sexualized expressions) and examined subsequent recognition of upright and inverted men and women. Consistent with our hypothesis, upright and inverted women were recognized similarly, indicating that women's bodies were recognized even when global information was absent and only local information was present. However, the classic inversion effect emerged for sexualized men, with upright men recognized better than inverted men, indicating that global information was required for male body recognition. The findings from this study are consistent with the notion that women are appraised locally and reduced to their body parts, but it remains unclear whether this effect can be explained by local processing of women's bodies more generally or the recognition of sexual body parts specifically as we have suggested .
To consider whether women's bodies are reduced specifically to their sexual body parts, we examined whether people would recognize women's (vs. men's) sexual body parts in isolation without requiring the spatial information about relations among the sexual body parts provided by the context of the entire body (similar to object recognition, Gervais et al. 2012) . Specifically, we hypothesized that women's sexual body parts would be recognized similarly regardless of whether they were presented in the context of entire bodies or in isolation (whole body recognition = body part recognition), whereas men's sexual body parts would be recognized better when they were presented in the context of entire bodies, rather than in isolation (whole body recognition > body part recognition). To test hypotheses, participants viewed photographs of men and women followed by photographs of slightly modified sexual body parts presented in the context of the entire body allowing for global, whole recognition or in isolation allowing for local, parts recognition only. Consistent with hypotheses, women's sexual body part recognition was equal to (and sometimes better than) women's whole body recognition. In effect, people reduced women to their sexual body parts by recognizing their body parts similar to object recognition (Tanaka and Farah 1993 ). Men's whole bodies were recognized better than men's sexual body parts, similar to person recognition. This effect emerges for sexualized and non-sexualized men and women, suggesting that people not only adopt a local perspective of women who are sexualized and highly attractive (e.g., models, Bernard et al. 2013a ), but also on those who are not sexualized and are average in attractiveness (e.g., everyday women, Gervais et al. 2012) .
Importantly, providing the first direct evidence that local processing underlies the recognition of women's sexual body parts during initial person perception, we ) reasoned that if local processing underlies the sexual objectification of women's bodies, then supporting or interfering with such processing should affect recognition. Consistent with this rationale, women's sexual body parts were recognized better than women's entire bodies under local processing objectives, but this effect was tempered under global processing objectives (Gervais et al. 2012, Experiment 2) . Like the inversion effect, this effect appears to be specific to women, with men's entire bodies recognized better than men's body parts, regardless of whether local or global processing objectives are introduced.
Local Objectified Categorization
A local appraisal of women might also manifest in category-based person perception. One example of category-based processing is the notion of fungibility or seeing someone as interchangeable with similar others (Haslam 2006; Nussbaum 1999) . That is, in the eyes of perceivers, when a person is reduced to a set of sexualized body parts or functions they become sexually fungible (interchangeable with women with similar sexual body parts or functions, Gervais et al. 2011a ). In pornographic media, for example, one centerfold may be interchangeable with another centerfold with similar sexual body parts, regardless of facial features, skills, abilities, personality features, and preferences. To empirically examine this possibility, we modified the "who said what" paradigm (Taylor et al. 1978) to examine whether women are interchangeable with other women with similar sexual body parts (Gervais et al. 2011a) . Participants initially saw photographs of men and women with average or exaggerated sexual body parts (e.g., larger chests, narrower waists). In a surprise recognition task, participants were then asked to match the bodies to the faces of the original men and women. Women were indeed sexually fungible; participants made more recognition errors when matching women's faces back to their bodies, but this effect was qualified by type of sexual body parts (exaggerated or average); participants confused the face-body pairing for women with large chests and narrow waists with other women with similar features, but not women with average chests and waists. Interestingly, men with exaggerated (vs. average) sexual body parts were also fungible, although they were still perceived as more powerful than women.
Local Impression Formation and Subsequent Behaviors
Research from our lab suggests that people adopt a local appraisal of women during initial person perception, including attention, recognition, and categorization of women's bodies. Additional research is needed to further examine the other stages of the model, including local objectified attribute activation and application during impression formation and local objectified attitudes and behaviors. Although there is no direct empirical support applying GLOMO to objectified impression formation (cf., Förster et al. 2008 , on GLOMO applied to social judgments more generally), existing objectification research can be reinterpreted through our model. Appearance-focus (Heflick and Goldenberg 2009 ), body reduction (Loughnan et al. 2010; Gray et al. 2011) , and sexualization (Vaes et al. 2011 ) have all been shown to cause object and animal attribute activation and human attribute inhibition. For example, Heflick and his colleagues found that famous women (e.g., Sarah Palin and Angelina Jolie; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009) as well as unfamiliar women (Heflick et al. 2011) were regarded as less warm and less competent when participants focused on their appearance rather than as an entire person. Considered through our local (vs. global) framework of objectification, appearance-focus may narrow attention to a very specific part of a woman, rather than the entire woman. Similarly, Loughnan et al. (2010) found similar effects when women's bodies only (vs. women's bodies and faces together) were presented to participants. Consistent with our general proposition, this work can be interpreted as showing that narrowing people's attention to women's bodies (vs. both faces and bodies) contributes to objectified and dehumanized social perception. As well, Vaes et al. (2011) have shown that characteristics associated with objects and animals are activated when women are presented in a sexualized manner (see also Cikara et al. 2010) . Sexualizing the body may naturally draw people's attention to those sexual body parts, and the resulting dehumanization that emerges is consistent with the notion that a local appraisal of women's bodies (a focus on sexual body parts) contributes to objectified impression formation. One might speculate that dehumanization may be an important mechanism through which initial local appraisals (e.g., a focus on a woman's body without a concomitant focus on her feelings and desires) cause subsequent adverse objectifying behaviors (e.g., the objectifying gaze, harassment).
Critical Next Steps for Research
In summary, we have suggested that objectification may manifest in a local appraisal of women during person perception and dehumanization may mediate the relation between local appraisals and adverse social perceptions and behaviors. Our work provides direct evidence for this during initial person perception stages, including attention , recognition (Bernard et al. 2012 (Bernard et al. , 2013a Gervais et al. 2012) , and categorization (Gervais et al. 2011a ) of women's bodies. Indirect evidence for other stages of the model, including local objectified impression formation (Cikara et al. 2010; Heflick and Goldenberg 2009; Heflick et al. 2011; Loughnan et al. 2010; Vaes et al. 2011 ) and objectified attitudes and behaviors (Rudman and Mescher 2012) comes from our reinterpretation of published research. Future research is needed to further examine when and why women are objectified during these different stages, to examine the relations between these different stages (e.g., does initial objectified attention provide the foundation for objectified impression formation and related behaviors or is the relation bidirectional), and to provide additional evidence of the specific role-both moderating ) and meditating-of global and local processing.
Considered through the GLOMO model, one might speculate that a host of target and perceiver features (both state and trait) that are associated with global and local processing more generally (not necessarily sexual objectification specifically) may cause sexual objectification of women. Recognizing women as sexual objects may be related to psychological distance (Liberman et al. 2007 ). Research in the area of construal level theory (e.g., Liberman and Trope 2008) , for example, shows that socially distant people are perceived in more global, or abstract ways (Liberman and Förster 2009) , which is consistent with theory suggesting that dehumanization is associated with vertical distance (for mechanistic dehumanization) or horizontal distance (for animalistic dehumanization) between perpetrators and targets (Haslam 2006) . Likewise, sexual objectification may be related to self-regulatory focus (Higgins 1997) . Research in the area of prevention focus, for example, suggests that prevention focus leads to narrowed, detailed-focused attention and memory (Förster and Higgins 2005) and thus, may also contribute to a local appraisal of women as sexual objects. Finally, threat, which causes a local appraisal to threatening stimuli, may serve to promote objectified perceptions of women.
From our perspective, exploring the role of culture in sexual objectification is a particularly intriguing avenue for further exploring these effects. Beauty standards and the representation of women's bodies vary across cultures. Indeed in their original formulation of objectification theory, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) situated this phenomenon within a particular context-Western cultures, where women are frequently and pervasively objectified in the media and interactions. Cultures not only vary in the content of cultural representations of women they hold, but cultures also impact the cognitive processes people use to appraise their environments. In an influential program of research, Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett and Masuda 2003) suggested that Easterners were more likely to adopt holistic processing styles compared to Westerners, who tend to adopt analytic processing styles. These styles approximate global and local processing and may represent important cultural attributes that contribute to objectified and dehumanized perceptions of women. Furthermore, over the course of history, deeply embedded philosophical differences in the ways people from these cultures appraised the world, as well as geographical differences (Miyamoto et al. 2006) , have impacted people's preferred cognitive styles. Given this reality, an open question concerns whether and how culture may modulate the way people appraise female bodies. For example, to the extent that Easterners adopt a global processing style, they may exhibit higher performance in the recognition of all whole bodies-both men and women. The opportunity to address this interplay between different representations of women and processing styles used to appraise women between cultures suggests that including culture is a critical direction for future research.
A related question pertains to the cultural membership of targets of objectification. In much of our research, targets have been scantily clad, thin, and white (representing Western cultural ideals of beauty). People may adapt their processing styles to the cultural membership of the target, which is revealed through physical features. By highlighting or concealing sexual body parts (e.g., via self-sexualization, Allen and Gervais 2012), for example, clothing may also modulate the processing styles people employ to appraise women. Such an approach importantly considers the interactions between perpetrators and targets of sexual objectification. Thus, clothing may be used by women as a form of identity performance (Klein et al. 2007 ) to modulate the processing styles of perpetrators. Whether, how, why, and with what consequences women can actively influence the ways their bodies are appraised by others remains a largely unexplored question .
A local appraisal of women may also be closely linked to self-objectification with a local appraisal of one's own body serving as an antecedent for related mental health consequences (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) , as well as a local appraisal of other women. For example, women themselves may adopt a local appraisal of their own bodies, attending to, recognizing, and categorizing their bodies in an objectified manner. As a result, stereotypes of sex objects may be activated and applied through selective self-stereotyping. These processes may set the stage for subsequent adverse attitudes and behaviors, including distracting cognitions and negative emotions, as well as depression, eating disorders, and sexual dysfunction (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) . They may also manifest in sexually objectifying self-presentation, such as self-sexualization Liss et al. 2011) . Providing initial evidence for the link between a local appraisal of the self and other women, Bernard et al. (2013a) found that self-objectification was associated with entire body recognition, with people, especially women, who reported more objectified self-concepts engaging in less whole-body recognition. Additionally, Allen et al. (2013) found that power, which has been linked to global processing (Keltner et al. 2003; Förster 2010) , tempered the effects of objectification on women, whereas powerlessness, which has been linked to local processing, exacerbated the negative effects of women recipients of objectification, contributing to restrained eating. Considered through the current framework, global processing may be an antidote to objectified selfperceptions and related consequences.
In summary, we have presented the novel framework of a unified objectification and dehumanization theory, as well as initial empirical evidence from our labs and others supporting this framework. In the remainder of the chapter, we briefly introduce the complementary perspectives on humanness, stereotype content, self-objectification, terror management, system justification, anthropomorphism, and discrimination, of the invited contributors to the 60th Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
Overview of Invited Perspectives
Humanness Haslam et al. (2013) present a psychology of humanness and provide empirical support in this tradition. In an effort to understand how people may be dehumanized, they begin by introducing their notion of "humanness." In particular, Haslam and his colleagues argue that the notion of humanness is multidimensional with two different notions of humanness-human nature and human uniqueness. They then provide a model of humanness denial and articulate the implications of their model. Supporting this model, Haslam et al. provide empirical work suggesting that people are sometimes perceived as animal-like, whereas others are sometimes perceived as machine-or object-like, resulting in different consequences (e.g., stereotyping, social exclusion). They also provide two interesting examples that complement their model, including perceptions of animals that are sources of meat for people and objectification as a dehumanization-like process.
Mixed Model of Stereotype Content
Next, approaching this topic from a theoretically distinct, but related approach, Fiske (2013) considers dehumanization through the lens of her widely influential mixed model of stereotype content. Specifically, she argues that like person perception more generally, recognizing or denying humanness varies along the universal dimensions of warmth and competence. That is, upon meeting another person or another group, people seek to understand the intentions of the other (i.e., warmth) and the ability for the other to act on those intentions (i.e., competence). Crossing these two dimensions, Fiske identifies four unique quadrants that characterize perceptions of different groups and individuals, depending on whether they are regarded as high in warmth and high in competence, high in warmth and low in competence, low in warmth and high in competence, or low in warmth and low in competence. These dimensions result in a predictable matrix of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Fiske then provides empirical evidence that the most dehumanized groups (low in both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance. She also provides evidence for mixed reactions to those groups who are high on one dimension and low on the other, with groups disliked for appearing cold, but competent, eliciting envy and Schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure from other's misfortunes). Regarding the other mixed groups who are seen as warm, but incompetent, they are pitied and helped. Finally, Fiske argues that humanization occurs for ingroup members who are regarded as both warm and competent.
Terror Management
Building and elaborating on Haslam et al. (2013) and Fiske's (2013) models of the content (thoughts, emotions, and behaviors) of dehumanization (and to a lesser extent objectification), Goldenberg (2013) and Calogero (2013) adopt classic social psychological theories, that do not stem directly from research on objectification or dehumanization, to understand when and why people objectify others and themselves. Goldenberg (2013) first adopts terror management theory as a lens through which to understand when and why people objectify themselves and others. Specifically, Goldenberg reviews classic philosophical theorizing on selfobjectification and presents the latest empirical research on objectification of others. She suggests that objectification involves rendering women as literal objects and considers perspectives that support and dispute this position. She then provides an existential perspective on when and why self-objectification and otherobjectification occurs. Placing the physical body squarely in the center of her analysis, she considers the unique capabilities of women's bodies to menstruate, lactate, and bear children as a basis for existential threats to themselves and others. According to Goldenberg, these threats provide the foundation of subsequent self-and other-objectification as people manage the terror associated with mortality threats of the corporeal body.
System Justification
Offering a distinct, but equally intriguing perspective and focusing primarily on self-objectification, Calogero (2013) adopts system justification theory to understand why and with what consequences women self-objectify. Calogero first offers a classic account of objectification theory, focusing primarily on the construct of self-objectification and its consequences. She then provides an account of another classic social psychological approach-system justification theory-with a specific focus on why and with what consequences disadvantaged group members justify a system that oppresses them. Providing a novel integration of these two theories, Calogero then offers a titillating consideration of self-objectification through a system justification lens. She reviews recent work in this tradition that directly or indirectly supports this integrative framework. Calogero's novel consideration provides a broader perspective of self-objectification and its consequences; she not only focuses on the mental health consequences originally articulated by objectification theory, but she also considers the system-level implications for collective action and social change. Epley et al. (2013) provide a refreshing counter perspective on these topics, stemming from their consideration of when and why people sometime treat non-human agents as people through anthropomorphism, specifically motivated mind perception. Epley and his colleagues explain some of the psychological processes that guide anthropomorphism of several different types of non-human agents, including nature, pets, computers, and gods. They argue that these processes are guided by the same motivational forces that underlie mind perception of people. Specifically, arguing that motivation guides attention, Epley et al. suggest that (a) motives to explain and understand behavior and (b) motives for social connection drive mind perception in both human and non-human agents. They also speculate about how these same processes may be related to dehumanization, which they define as failing to attribute mind to a person.
Anthropomorphism
A Pantheoretical Framework
Finally, Moradi (2013) integrates each of these perspectives and provides a novel, pantheoretical framework of discrimination, objectification, and dehumanization from the target's perspective. She notes that objectification and dehumanization have long been known to underlie extreme and blatant forms of violence, but have more recently been shown to manifest in everyday interactions as well. Although classic psychological work in the area of objectification has focused on the target's perspective (e.g., objectification theory specifically focuses on women's experiences with objectification), recent work has also adopted the perpetrator's perspective. Returning the conversation to the target's perspective, including a focus on the consequences for recipients, communities, and societies that are dehumanized or objectified, Moradi transforms the objects of dehumanization and objectification to subjects. She integrates theory and research on the target's experiences of everyday discrimination, including stereotyping, stigmatization, marginalization, prejudice, and discrimination based on a target's minority status. She then integrates stress and coping frameworks, minority stress theory, and objectification theory, identifying the similarities and differences in these perspectives, and providing a pantheoretical theory of dehumanization, based on her integration of these traditions as well as the perspectives of the authors from this volume.
Concluding Thoughts
Identifying the motivational triggers and consequences of objectification and dehumanization is a challenging, but worthwhile endeavor. In this chapter, we provided classic perspectives on objectification and dehumanization from psychology, but also other social science disciplines (e.g., philosophy, feminist theory, anthropology). Next, we offered the initial makings of a unified theory of objectification and dehumanization based on our own work. Finally, we summarized some of the most influential contemporary perspectives on objectification and dehumanization from the current prominent scholars in the field. We hope you enjoy reading more about these perspectives in the subsequent chapters of this volume. We also hope these considerations have piqued your interest and will motivate you to consider the other chapters in this volume, as well as engage in exciting new inquiries into the areas of motivation, objectification, and dehumanization.
